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COMMENT
ANTI-STRIKEBREAKING LEGISLATION-THE EFFECT
AND VALIDITY OF STATE-IMPOSED
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
The principal weapon of organized labor in pressing its collective
bargaining demands is the strike-a withholding of labor, usually
accompanied by picketing and other tactics, in an effort to shut down
the employer's business or to make it so unprofitable that he will come
to terms with the union rather than suffer a great economic loss.
Although section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' guarantees
the right of employees to engage in this concerted activity, and section
8(a) (1) forbids employers "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of this right,2 nowhere does the act guarantee
that the strike tactic will be effective in its objectives. Instead, an
economic strike might be defeated by a wide range of countermeasures
which federal labor policy has left open to employers, including the
right of an employer to continue his business with the help of labor
replacements.' Although the importance and feasibility of hiring replacements to "break" a strike varies according to the industry and
other circumstances, it is evident that in those instances where strikers
may be successfully replaced the union loses much of its collective
bargaining leverage. Despite the increased cost of recruiting and training replacements, the employer may indeed find such a tactic preferable
to the alternatives of meeting the union's demands or shutting down
completely. Furthermore, the mere threat of replacement may discourage the use of the strike weapon since, if replaced, economic
strikers may permanently lose their jobs " (and consequently the
seniority they have accrued through years of working for a particular
employer). It is also likely that the union, in a subsequent certification
election, will lose its representation of the shop.5
In the past six years the traditional right of employers to hire
strike replacements has increasingly come under fire. The International
Typographical Union, after having been dealt repeated defeats because
of the successful use of labor replacements in strikes against small and
'61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
261 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (1) (1964).
See
3 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
generally Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 630 (1966).
4 Presently, economic strikers are entitled to reinstatement only if the jobs they
left were not filled during the strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., mipra
note 3; NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953); Caldwell Packaging Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 495 (1959).
5 See Canton Sterilized Wiping Cloth Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1960) ; Manhattan
Adhesives Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1959).
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medium-sized newspapers,' drafted in 1960 a model "citizens' job protection bill." Based partly on an existing Pennsylvania statute,7 it
attempts to outlaw certain replacement practices on which the newspaper industry, in particular, has depended. The union has supplemented this by adopting as its model municipal ordinance one passed
in Albany, New York, in 1963. Under the joint sponsorship of the
ITU and the AFL-CIO, similar state legislation and municipal ordinances have now been enacted in a total of thirteen states and eightyeight municipalities.' Furthermore, an ITU and AFL-CIO-supported
federal anti-replacement bill (similar to the state enactments) has recently been introduced in Congress.9
Although the provisions of the anti-strikebreaking laws vary to
some extent in their details and scope, the general thrust is to prevent
an employer involved in a strike, lockout or "labor dispute" from
(1) hiring replacements through the aid of third parties not "directly
involved" in the labor dispute,'" (2) recruiting or importing replace6 See note 44 infra.
7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,

§ 206

(1964)

(enacted in 1937).

Pennsylvania was the

first state to enact an anti-replacement statute.
8 In addition to that of Pennsylvania, the other state anti-strikebreaking statutes
include: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp. 1964); HAWAII REV. LAws §§ 90C-1
to -3 (Supp. 1965) ; IowA CoDE § 736B.6 (Supp. 1965); LA. Ry. STAT. §§ 23:900-904

(1964); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 851-56 (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art.

100, § 51A (1964) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150D, §§ 1-6 (1965) ; MicH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.456(1)-(4) (Supp. 1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§275-A:1-5 (1966); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§34:13C-1 to -6 (1965); RI. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§28-10-10 to -14
(Supp. 1965) ; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.100, .110 (1962).
In addition to Albany, the municipalities inwhich ordinances have been passed
include: Akron, Ohio, Albany, Calif., Anderson, Ind., Ashtabula, Ohio, Atlantic City,
N.J., Barberton, Ohio, Bayonne, N.J., Belleville, Ill., Belleville, N.J., Berkeley, Calif.,
Brook Park, Ohio, Buffalo, N.Y., Canton, Ohio, Carteret, N.J., Catlin, Ill., Cheektowaga, N.Y., Chicopee, Mass., Cleveland, Ohio, Cliffside, N.J., Covington, Ky.,
Denver, Colo., Dunellen, N.J., East Cleveland, Ohio, East Liverpool, Ohio, Edison,
N.J., Elizabeth, N.J., Erie, Pa., Fresno, Calif., Gary, Ind., Georgetown, Ill., Hoboken,
N.J., Hudson, N.Y., Indianapolis, Ind., Irvington, N.J., Jamestown, N.Y., Jersey
City, N.J., Lackawanna, N.Y., Linden, N.J., Lockport, Ill., Lorain, Ohio, Madison,
'N.J., Madison, Wis., Manchester, N.H., Martinez, Calif., Massillon, Ohio, Metuchen,
N.J., Morristown, N.J., Newark, N.J., New Britain, Conn., New Brunswick, N.J.,
New Haven, Conn., Newport, Ky., New York, N.Y., Niagara Falls, N.Y., Niles, Ohio,
North Bergen, N.J., North Tonawanda, N.Y., Orange, N.J., Palo Alto, Calif., Parma,
Ohio, Peabody, Mass., Perth Amboy, N.J., Pittsburg, Calif., Plainfield, N.J., Poughkeepsie, N.Y., Poughkeepsie (Town), N.Y., Rahway, N.J., Richmond, Calif., Rochester,
N.Y., St.Louis, Mo., Salem, Mass., San Francisco, Calif., San Jose, Calif., Sayreville, N.J., Shively, Ky., Springfield, Ohio, Sunnyvale, Calif., Tilton, Ill., Toledo,
Ohio, Trenton, N.J., Troy, N.Y., Union City, N. J., West New York, N.J., Westville,
Ill., Wilmington, Del., Woodbridge, N.J., Youngstown, Ohio. (Information about
municipal ordinances was supplied by the International Typographical Union).
9 S.1781, H.R. 9422, H.R. 10536, H.R. 10623, H.R. 10746, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) (identical bills).
10 Section 1 of the proposed "Citizens' Job Protection Law" provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, agency, firm or corporation,
or officer or agent thereof, to recruit, procure, supply, or refer any person
for employment in place of an employee involved in a labor dispute in which
such person, partnership, agency, firm, or corporation is not directly
interested.
Section 2(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, firm or corporation, or officer
or agent thereof, involved in a labor dispute . . . to employ any person in
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ments from outside the state or city," and (3) hiring "professional
strikebreakers," 1 or persons who have "customarily and repeatedly" "a
worked or offered to work in place of employees involved in a strike,
lockout or "labor dispute." Stiff criminal penalties (usually a maximum of one thousand dollars and one year in prison) may be imposed
on the employer, the third parties and on the "customary and repeated"

replacements themselves.' 4 If valid, these laws would go a long way
toward guaranteeing a union's power to shut down an employer's
business. (At least two municipal ordinances 15 outlaw the hiring of
strike replacements altogether.) 16
place of an employee involved in a labor dispute, who is recruited, procured,
supplied or referred for employment by any person, partnership, agency, firm
or corporation not directly involved in the labor dispute.
Similar provisions exist in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp. 1964) ; HAWAII
REV. LAWS §§ 90C-1(a), (d) (Supp. 1965); IowA CODE §§ 736B.6(1), (4) (Supp.
1965); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:902 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 852 (Supp.
1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-2 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206 (1964).
11 States forbidding the importation of out-of-state labor replacements include
Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.456(3) (Supp. 1965), and New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:13C-1 (1965).
12 See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., POLICE CODE art. 9.5 (1964); CLEVELAND,
OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 13.112501 (1964).
13 See, e.g., HAWAII REv. LAWS § 90C-1(b) (Supp. 1965) ; IOWA CODE § 736B.6(2)
(Supp. 1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 853-54 (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17.456(1), (2) (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §51A (1964);
R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§ 28-10-10 to -12 (Supp. 1965).
14 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp. 1964); HAWAII REV. LAws
§ 90C-3 (Supp. 1965) ; LA. REV. STAT. § 23:904 (1964) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206
(1964) ; NEW YORE, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 42, tit. A (1963). For various
other penalties, see, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 150D, § 5 (1965) ($500 to $1,000
for first offense, $1,000 to $5,000 for subsequent offenses) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 856 (Supp. 1966) ($300 and/or 180 days) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 51A(c)
(1964) ($100 to $1,000 and/or three years) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A :5 (1966)
($100 and/or six months); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-10-14 (Supp. 1965) ($500
and/or one year). Other statutes make the offense simply a misdemeanor, e.g., MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.456(4) (Supp. 1965) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-5 (1964), or a gross
misdemeanor. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.100, .110 (1962).
15 Chicopee, Mass., Newark, N.J. The Newark ordinance, passed Feb. 21, 1966,
provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, to recruit any
person or persons for employment, or to secure or to offer to secure for any
person or persons any employment when the purpose thereof is to have such
persons take the place in employment of employees in an industry or business
where a labor strike or a lockout exists.
The ordinance provides a maximum penalty of $500 and/or ninety days' imprisonment.
16 Depending on the particular piece of legislation, these basic elements have been
shuffled, combined and modified. The Maryland and Rhode Island statutes forbid
third parties to recruit or furnish professional or "customary and repeated" strikebreakers, MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 51A (1964) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-10-10
(Supp. 1965), while the Massachusetts and Washington statutes prohibit third parties
from recruiting or importing replacements from out-of-state. MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 150D, §§ 1, 3 (1965) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.100 (1962). Some statutes apply
whenever there is a "labor dispute" in existence, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150D,
§§ 1-5 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-A:1-5 (1966); CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 13.112501 (1964), while others are specifically limited to strikes
and lockouts. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp. 1964) ; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 23:900904 (1964) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 851-56 (Supp. 1966) ; MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.456(1)-(4) (Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.100 (1962); NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 42, tit. A (1962); SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., POLICE
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Anti-strikebreaking laws have yet been invoked in only two reported cases.17 In one, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a poorly
worded statute as being void for vagueness."8 In the other, the language of a New York City ordinance 19 was construed as not applicable
to the facts, the constitutional questions thus being avoided.2" In the
absence of any significant judicial precedent regarding these laws, it
shall be the purpose of this Comment to examine their effect on national
labor policy, their desirability from a policy standpoint and their
validity.
Effects of Anti-Strikebreaking Laws on Union-Employer Relations
Anti-strikebreaking provisions prohibiting the use of third parties
to recruit, refer or furnish replacements severely limit a struck employer's access to labor markets, even through normal channels. They
prevent resort to the referral services of employers' associations and,
under the terms of most of the laws, prevent referrals by even licensed
employment agencies. However, there are a number of ways in which
a resourceful employer could probably side-step this type of provision.
Since most strikes can be anticipated, 2 ' the employer could obtain referrals from third parties before the strike is actually called. (This
CODE art. 9.5 (1964). Some further require that a recognized labor union be involved.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp. 1964). Some of the laws specifically
require knowledge as an element of the crime. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 26,
§ 856 (Supp. 1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §275-A:3 (1966); CLEVELAND, OHIO,
CODIFnm ORDINANCES § 13.112501 (1964); NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMINISMATIVE CODE
ch. 42, tit. A (1963). In most statutes the activity legislated against is declared to
be unlawful, but in the Massachusetts statute, part of the regulation is accomplished
by requiring the employer to register out-of-state replacements and to file certain
information with the state as public records. MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 150D, § 3 (1965).
Massachusetts, in addition, forbids the hiring of any strikebreaker known by the
employer to have been convicted of a felony within seven years. MASS. ANN. LAWS

ch. 150D, § 3 (1965).

Some of the laws make exceptions for common carriers, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp.
1964); LA. REV. STAT. §23:904 (1964), and licensed or state employment agencies.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (Supp. 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206
(1964); WASH. REV. CODE §49.44.100 (1962). Although the New Jersey statute
excepts the state employment service from general coverage of the statute, the statute
forbids it from "knowingly" referring labor replacements. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-3
(1965). Under the Louisiana statute and the New York City ordinance, it appears
that although licensed employment agencies may refer persons from within the state
or city,
they may not import persons from outside.
17
1However, there have been arrests and lower court convictions. In what was
apparently the first conviction under the 1937 Pennsylvania statute, the Bucks County
Court, in April, 1960, fined one Bloor Schleppey $500 for recruiting labor replacements on behalf of the Bristol Printing Company of Levittown, Pa. No defense was
pleaded. Editor & Publisher, April 9, 1960, p. 66.
18 State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).
1
9 Nw YoRK, N.Y., ADnsmSRATivE CODE ch. 42, tit. A (1963).
2
o People v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 36 Misc. 2d 833, 233 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct.

§34:13C-6 (1965), agricultural industries, e.g., DEL.

1962).

21 Section 8(d) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1) (1964), provides that no party shall terminate or modify an
existing collective bargaining contract without giving the other party sixty days'
notice of the proposed modification.
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might not be permissible under statutes using the term "labor dispute,"
since such a dispute would generally precede the strike.) Another
technique would be for the employer to hire at least one strikebreaker
on his own, and make him foreman. This person could then hire
other strikebreakers known to him, acting as the employer's agent
rather than as a third party.
The provisions regulating or prohibiting the use of replacements
from outside the city or state severely limit the area in which an
employer can seek replacements, since they set up artificial boundaries
to labor supplies and cut across existing labor markets. For example,
under the New Jersey statute,' Camden employers would be allowed
to hire replacements from distant Jersey City, but not from neighboring
Philadelphia. The New York City ordinance,23 like other municipal
ordinances, would prevent the hiring of replacements who live in the
suburbs.
The provisions regarding "professional strikebreakers" have the
effect of denying some employers access to the most willing, reliable
Thus if an emand quickly located source of labor replacements.'
ployer wishes to replace strikers, he must find nonunion workers who
have not yet acted as replacements, or who have done so with such
infrequency as not to fall within the indistinct "customary and repeated" definition.
The possible consequences of the "job protection" laws do not
stop with strike and lockout situations, since many of the statutes are
worded so as to apply whenever the employees replaced are involved
in a "labor dispute." 2" Most of the laws do not define the term,
although in some states the definition is contained in other labor
statutes. The generally accepted definition is found in section 2(9)
of the National Labor Relations Act:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
22N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1 (1965).
23
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINIsTRATIVE CODE ch. 42, tit. A (1963).
24 The New York City ordinance, however, has been held not to prevent the importation of persons who are already in the employ of the struck employer anywhere
else in the country. People v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 36 Misc. 2d 833, 233 N.Y.S.2d
988 (Sup. Ct 1962).
25 See text accompanying notes 35-44 infra.
26 See note 16 supra. Some of the laws, including the Washington statute, do
not simply apply to the replacement of an employee involved in a strike or lockout,
but to the replacement of "employees in a business owned by a person, firm or corporation involved in a labor strike or lockout . . . ." WAs. REv. CODE § 49.44.100
(1962). The purpose of this wording is possibly to include the replacement of persons
who refuse to cross picket lines set up by other employees on strike, but the effect
would appear far greater. It might mean that whenever any of an employer's employees are on strike, he is restricted in the replacement of any other employee who
leaves his job during that period, regardless of whether the reason for that employee's
leaving was in any way related to the strike.
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maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.27
Thus, a "labor dispute" does not come into existence only during a
strike or lockout, but begins whenever an employee, employees or a
union make demands for changes in wages, working conditions or
union representation, or when grievances are raised in regard to discharges, alleged violation or interpretation of a contract.2" Since the
anti-strikebreaking laws contain no requirement that the union's demands be reasonable (nor, under most of the laws, that the strike be
lawful '), the employer might become an easy victim of labor blackmail
by the threat of some "labor dispute." It is not necessary that the
pressure come from union sources. A few employees, in critical or
highly specialized occupations, who could not be replaced without the
help of special employment agencies, could close down a company at
the expense of thousands of workers. Moreover, in the newspaper
industry, to be considered in more detail below,"0 such labor blackmail
could even give unions the power to influence editorial policy."1
In ascertaining the need for anti-strikebreaking legislation to protect the bargaining position of unions, one of the most startling considerations is the fact that these laws are appearing on the statute
books so late in the history of the labor movement. Certainly organized
labor's hatred of the practice of labor replacement and of the "scabs"
who take the jobs of strikers is not new, since they have always represented a fundamental threat to the strike weapon. Yet, during the
long absence of anti-strikebreaking laws, it is clear that the employers'
legal right to replace strikers has not rendered the labor movement
impotent. If legislators are suddenly to find an overriding need for
such legislation, they should first explain how organized labor has
been able to achieve its tremendous progress in raising labor standards
and attaining political and economic power without it.
2761

Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964).

labor dispute would also exist when the union regularly opens contract
negotiations sixty days prior to the expiration of its contract During the period of
negotiations, until a new contract is signed, the employer would be prevented from
using any third party to assist him in securing replacements for employees covered
by the contract who quit work, and this would include union business agents and
chapel chairmen acting as agents for the union in providing replacement employees.
If the employer did use a third party he would have committed a felony, according to
the particular statute, and so would the third party.
290f the state statutes, only New Jersey requires that the strike be lawful. N.J.
28A

STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1 (1965).
80 See text accompanying notes 35-44 infra.

31 In 1962, an edition of the Cleveland Press was allegedly held up for several
hours because a union leader objected to the wording of a political advertisement
and would not permit his men to handle the newspaper until the advertisement which
offended him was changed. Statement by W. Melvin Street, General Manager, New
York State Publishers Association, Before the New York Joint Legislative Committee
on Industrial and Labor Conditions, March 9, 1964.
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One of the basic reasons for labor's continued bargaining power
is that the increased difficulty and expense of operating a plant during
a strike, even with the use of replacements, provides some degree of
incentive for the employer to reach a peaceful settlement with the
union. Furthermore, where a large number of employees is involved,
the problem of recruiting a sufficient number of qualified replacements
to operate the plant may be insurmountable, and even where this can
be accomplished, the union may block the replacements' entrance to
the plant by mass picketing and other forms of interference." Many
employers in such situations may find other tactics more feasible in
mitigating the effects of a strike. These tactics include: continuing
operations on a limited basis by using supervisory personnel; stockpiling some of the plant's output prior to the strike so as to maintain
a sufficient inventory to fill orders; diversifying business so as to have
other plants and enterprises in operation; and subcontracting work to
Another common practice is the "sympathetic
other employers.
lockout," whereby a group of competing employers dealing with the
same union agrees that in the event of a "whipsaw" strike (in which
the union shuts down the employers one at a time) the others will
shut down also.34 The struck employer's resistance to the strike is
increased since he is relieved of competitive pressure, while the union's
resistance is decreased because of the additional members put out of
work and the resulting drain on any strike fund which the union
might have.
Because of the impracticalities mentioned above and the availability of other tactics, the practice of labor replacement is simply not
important in most large industries today. Therefore, the effect of the
anti-strikebreaking laws cannot be viewed in terms of the labor movement in general, but rather in terms of specific instances in which labor
replacement is feasible. Since unions bargaining under such circumstances doubtless find themselves at a greater disadvantage than unions
in industries where strikebreaking poses no threat, they would obviously welcome anti-strikebreaking legislation as a way of securing the
same bargaining advantage enjoyed by the rest of organized labor.
But although such laws may seem fair from labor's standpoint, they
completely ignore the vast differences between individual employers in
their ability to protect their businesses by tactics other than replacement,
and hence their ability to withstand a strike. Since the anti-strikebreaking legislation in question does not outlaw labor replacement as
such, but only certain replacement practices, it contains inherent in32 See generally Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need for Federal
Injunctions, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1966); Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1964).
33 See MARBY, LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 369-71 (1966).
34This tactic was held lawful in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87
(1957). See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (upholding use of tactic in
conjunction with labor replacements).
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equalities in its impact on both employers and unions. It would not
cover situations in which an employer could himself find qualified
replacements within the state or community, but only those in which
he finds it necessary to seek the aid of third parties, import replacements from outside the state or municipality or hire persons who have
"customarily and repeatedly" worked or offered to work in place of
strikers. The limitation of the laws to these specific practices has a
special significance. Although one of the consequences would simply
be the increased difficulty of recruiting replacements in any given
situation, the primary effect would be to make replacement virtually
impossible for those employers who must quickly obtain highly skilled
craftsmen of which there is an insufficient number available in any
single area.
In addition to their varying effect on different employers, the
anti-replacement provisions have a further weakness in that they do
not adequately protect employees in many situations. For example,
where the employees attempting to strike are small in number, and
especially where the jobs they perform are not highly specialized, the
employer might easily recruit a sufficient number of qualified replacements without resorting to any of the practices condemned by the
laws. An employer, without importing or hiring any professional
strikebreakers or collaborating with third parties, might completely
fill a small shop with local unemployed. In such a situation, even a
union with a large strike fund, and of course small locals with no
international affiliation, are powerless in collective bargaining negotiations and wholly unprotected by the anti-strikebreaking laws.
Importance of Replacement in the Newspaper Industry
The probable impact of anti-strikebreaking legislation can probably
best be studied in relation to the newspaper industry, since the model
legislation which is currently being proposed, and which has recently
been enacted in a number of states, was undoubtedly drafted with that
industry in mind. 5 The daily newspaper industry is one in which
the cessation of operations may be disastrous, since few tactics other
than labor replacement are available to mitigate the effects of a strike.3"
Stockpiling is of course impossible, since no one can publish tomorrow's
newspaper in advance. If the strike is by employees in the "back
shop," it is usually impossible, because of the high degree of skill and
specialization required, for nonstriking personnel from other depart3 The primary draftsman and sponsor of such legislation is the International

Typographical Union-the largest and most powerful of the newspaper unions. See
text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
36 Discussions in this Comment regarding replacement practices in the newspaper
industry are based on personal observation and information gained by the author
while working for the New England Daily Newspaper Association office in Worcester,
Mass., during the summers of 1962-1964, and in conversations with personnel of various
daily newspapers in 1965-1966.
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ments to work as adequate replacements; and it is usually impossible
to subcontract to another plant such a large job as publishing a daily
newspaper. Furthermore, the losses involved in shutting down a daily
newspaper g'o far beyond the mere expense of unrequited overhead.
When a newspaper stops publishing-especially when it has nearby
competitors-the readers and advertisers which it has taken years to
acquire must switch to other papers. Since reading and subscribing
to a certain newspaper are largely habitual, once that habit is broken
it may be difficult to reverse the process. Therefore, when the struck
a certain percentage of its former patrons
paper resumes publishing,
87
may never return.

Despite these pressures, large metropolitan dailies usually do not
attempt replacement because of the large number of employees involved.
The problem is aggravated because many of their departments-including editorial personnel-are also likely to be unionized and will
respect the picket line. Therefore they often resort to the tactic of
joining a "sympathetic lockout" agreement with competing newspapers
in the same city to mitigate the effects of a whipsaw strike."8 Such an
arrangement is feasible where the newspapers have the same area of
circulation and deal with the same unions. It is not generally available
to small and medium-sized local papers since they are usually located
in different neighboring towns, may not all be unionized to the same
extent and usually have nonconcurrent, although overlapping, areas of
circulation. Small and medium-sized papers have an advantage over
their metropolitan cousins, however, in that union activity is often
confined to one or two departments in the back shop, and the number
of employees involved in a strike is small enough to allow feasible
replacement.
But the provisions contained in the anti-strikebreaking bills,
although generally not prohibiting the hiring of replacements per se,
are such as virtually to destroy a publisher's ability to operate during
a strike. The practices which newspapers use to replace strikersespecially those from the "back shop," where most strikes occur-are
based on the limited labor supply available. Since the typographical,
stereotyping and pressman jobs all require highly skilled personnel,
the publisher cannot simply draw upon the local supply of unemployed,
unskilled laborers. Furthermore, these crafts--especially typographyare highly unionized. So the problem is to find a sufficient number
37 The possibility of a ruinous marathon strike is a realistic threat, especially
where a small paper is dealing with powerful unions such as the ITU, since there is
almost no limit to the length of time that the international strike fund will allow the
local union to hold out. The ITU strike fund, for example, provides strikers with
60% of their regular wages for an indefinite period, sometimes exceeding five years.
In addition, each striker is guaranteed, whenever possible, one day's work every week
as a substitute for union members in nearby shops, to increase his earnings. See
Typographical Union, Bylaws, art. XXI, § 10 (1966).
International
88
See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th

Cir. 1965).
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of qualified, nonunion craftsmen who are either unemployed or willing
to leave their regular jobs to come to work in the struck plant. It is
unlikely that the publisher will be able to find even a handful of such
persons in his own community since the specialized nature of a printing
tradesman's work usually demands that he live only in places where
newspaper jobs are available. Since the struck publisher will need
anywhere from a dozen to more than one hundred of these qualified
workers, he must therefore import them-certainly from outside the
municipality, and almost always from outside the state.
The problem is most serious in the case of the typographers, who
comprise by far the largest group in the back shop. The International
Typographical Union has a unique means of controlling the labor
supply in this trade, for although ITU contracts are ostensibly "open
shop," the hiring clauses contained in all such contracts make it virtually
impossible for the employer to hire any nonunion journeyman who is
not approved by the union.3 9 Furthermore, because of the high degree
of discipline exercised by the union,40 it cannot be expected that ITU
members can be hired to cross a picket line and work during a strike.
It is a monumental task for the publisher to find prospective replacements outside the city or state, especially in view of the short
time in which it must be accomplished in order to maintain daily
publication. For this reason publishers usually find it necessary to
obtain the assistance of third parties not directly involved in the
labor dispute. The use of actual "strikebreaking agencies," in business
solely to supply labor replacements for profit, is rare today if it exists
at all. But there are other organizations which do supply similar
services. Most important are the publishers' associations-including
the American Newspaper Publishers Association and similar regional
associations-which, as a part of their regular services, maintain files
of persons in the various newspaper trades seeking employment. The
ANPA or the publisher's regional association manager may know
39 The standard apprenticeship clause requires that any person entering the trade
must serve a six-year apprenticeship at a fraction of the regular wage scale before
he may become a journeyman, and that only one apprentice may be employed for
every ten journeymen employed in the plant. (Thus, on the average, it would take
sixty years to replace a journeyman.) Nonunion typographers cannot be employed
as journeymen in a plant where the ITU has a contract unless they pass a qualifying
"examination." However, the hiring clause sets no standards for such an examination,
but provides instead that they be agreed upon by a joint committee of management
and the union. See American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782
(7th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); Evans v. International Typographical
Union, 81 F. Supp. 675 (S.D. Ind. 1948); Evans v. International Typographical
Union, 76 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ind. 1948).
40 Union bylaws provide that each member must contribute 2.5% of his wages
to the union pension fund. At the age of sixty he can receive $22 a week from the
fund for the rest of his life if he is in good standing with the union. Since to disobey
the union by crossing a picket line would constitute "conduct unbecoming a union
member," such action might result in expulsion, causing forfeiture of a member's
entire investment in the pension fund. See International Typographical Union, Constitution art. IX, §§ 1(a) - (d) (1966); International Typographical Union, Bylaws,

art. XX, § 1, art V, § 17 (1966).
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which of these persons are currently working in nonunion shops and
which of them have been willing to work at struck plants in the past.
The ANPA or the regional association may contact other regional
associations for such references by telephone, and thereby cover the
entire United States if necessary.
The search for replacements makes use of an extensive "grapevine" which includes not only the publishers' associations but individual
nonunion tradesmen themselves. It is common that one person who
is willing to work as a replacement will know of several other persons
in his trade who are either unemployed or dissatisfied with their present
jobs. These persons are telephoned by the publisher or by employees
of one of the associations, and notified that they would be required to
work in place of strikers (since such notice is required by law in
some states) 41 If they accept the offer, they are provided with transportation fare and expense allowances which generally cover the time
it would ordinarily take to set up permanent residence near the struck
plant. They are also generally guaranteed a certain amount of overtime during the first few weeks of the strike, as an additional incentive
for them to take the job. In addition, there are also tradesmen who
are not initially solicited by the publisher, but who learn of the strike
through the news media or by word-of-mouth, and who contact the
publisher and offer their services on their own initiative.
For a variety of reasons, the majority of persons hired as replacements generally fall into the category of "professional strikebreakers"persons who "customarily and repeatedly" accept or offer to accept
employment in place of strikers.4 2 First of all, they generally must
have had a history of employment as replacements in order that the
publishers' associations and the other strikebreakers know of their
existence. Many of them originally came from nonunion shops in
the South, and, because of the difficulty of obtaining employment in
union shops, found that their best opportunity for earning the higher
wages prevalent in the North was to accept employment in struck
plants. Later, if they wished to change employers, the labor replacement situation again opened the way. Secondly, there are only a limited
number of people who are willing to change their residence to distant
places and to face the uncertainty and possibility of violence inherent
in a strike situation. Thus, the persons most willing to work as strike
replacements are usually those who have done it before.
4'See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §973; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §31-121
HAWAII REV. LAWS §90C-I(e) (Supp. 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 607, 608 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.

(1961);
149, §22
§ 28-10-9

(Supp.
1965).
42Discusslons
in this Comment relating to the traits and background of
"pro-

fessional strikebreakers" are based on the author's personal observation of and
acquaintanceship with at least two dozen persons who have frequently worked as labor
replacements in the typographical trade. These observations were made while the
author was employed as a labor replacement at the Concord (N.H.) Monitor during
June and July of 1963, and while employed at the New England Daily Newspaper
Association. See note 36 supra.
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The opportunity to earn large amounts of overtime during the
first few weeks of a strike is one of the primary incentives which draw
strikebreakers. Although it would be an unfair labor practice for the
publisher to offer the replacement greater compensation than was
offered to union members,4 3 undermanning and unfamiliarity with the
particular plant's operation often make extraordinary amounts of overtime a practical necessity. As work within the plant becomes normalized, the publisher will gradually replace the strikebreakers with
persons willing to work on a more regular basis-whether they be
unskilled local people to be trained on the job or skilled workers elsewhere in the industry. Some of the original strikebreakers may themselves remain with the newspaper on a permanent basis and take up
residence in the community, but others will leave as overtime and
expense allowances are cut.
The employment of strike replacements in small and mediumsized newspapers throughout the United States has become so common
and the means of recruitment so efficient that in a majority of cases a
newspaper union cannot force a shutdown except in the big cities. 4
Although some publishers will go to great lengths to avoid the distastefulness of a strike, a strong-willed publisher can use the labor
replacement threat to good advantage at the bargaining table. Furthermore, many publishers, in negotiating union contracts, use labor
consultants supplied by the same publishers' association that will help
provide the replacements if a strike occurs. Even independently hired
contract negotiators find it wise to have channels through which replacements can promptly be recruited. For these reasons the antistrikebreaking laws are of utmost importance to the newspaper trade
unions.
Public Policy Justifications
Although the desire for increased bargaining advantage has apparently been the motivating force behind labor's support of antiCf. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir. 1950).
survey of strike information contained in the ANPA Labor Bulletins for
the years 1956-1965 reveals that, out of thirty-six strikes by the ITU against newspapers in cities with a population greater than 250,000, 94.4% resulted in a total
shutdown of operations. However, out of eighty-six such strikes in cities with a
population of less than 250,000, only 30.2% resulted in a total shutdown, 2.3% resulted
in a partial shutdown and in 67.4% of the cases the struck papers were able to continue publication either for the entire duration of the strike or to resume publication
within a brief time. The percentages for all cities combined are: total shutdown,
49.2%; partial shutdown, 1.6%; continuation of publication, 49.2%.
(For the purposes of this survey, a "strike" is defined as each instance where
an individual newspaper is struck, or involved in a lockout in response to a whipsaw
strike, for more than one day, regardless of whether several papers are under joint
or the same ownership or are struck simultaneously. It includes, in addition to ordinary bargaining strikes, wildcat strikes, recognitional strikes where more than one
43

44A

union member is employed, breach of contract strikes and three cases where union

typographers engaging in contract negotiations quit their jobs in unison instead of
striking.)
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strikebreaking legislation, allegations of the undesirable effects of
strikebreaking practices on the community have been made to justify
the passage of these laws. 5 Proponents of the laws have argued that
states and municipalities have an interest in protecting the jobs of their
citizens from outside labor replacements in order to prevent the loss
of wages which would otherwise help support the local economy, the
loss of taxes and the necessity for community support of replaced
employees by welfare and relief funds. Furthermore, it is argued,
strikebreaking ultimately weakens the labor movement within a community, resulting in lower wages and labor standards.46
These economic arguments appear to be one-sided, since they
ignore cases in which replacement might actually benefit the community.
The operation of a business with replacements may provide a continued
source of income to the community and service to the public. If the
business has other employees whose jobs depend upon the operation
of a single department which is on strike, the use of replacements would
enable them to continue work, whereas a complete shutdown would
force these nonstriking employees out of work also. If the company's
business is such that it can survive neither a strike nor the union's
demands, the employer might otherwise go out of business completely,
with the result that the strikers would lose their jobs anyway, in
addition to the permanent loss of jobs of employees in other departments and the loss of a source of income to the community.
Another undesirable result of strikebreaking is the danger of
picket line violence, which generally occurs only when an employer
attempts to continue operations with replacements and other nonstrikers.4 7 But almost without exception, such violence is attributable
to acts either directly committed or provoked by union pickets in their
attempt to bar lawful entrance to the struck plant by mass picketing.4"
There are two basic alternatives which may be used to eliminate this
problem: (1) restraining the pickets, who are the direct cause of the
violence, or (2) turning back the replacements, thus avoiding violence
by appeasing the pickets. The second alternative is obviously more
desirable from the union's standpoint, since it puts state and local
government on the side of the strikers. Local officials may also find
that controlling the activities of employers would be more expedient
45 See International Typographical Union, Facts About Professional Strikebreakers; International Typographical Union, Rats For Hire-The Story of Professional Strikebreakers; Van Arkel, Citizens' Job Protection Laws (undated pamphlets obtainable from the ITU, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania). The pamphlet by Van Arkel, ITU General Counsel, attempts to justify
anti-strikebreaking laws as within the permissible scope of state police power.
46

See ibid.
47 See Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need for Federal Injunctions,
114 U. PA. L. R1v. 459 (1966).
48 See Note, The Enforcement of the Right to Access in Mass Picketing Situations, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1964).
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than controlling the acts of the pickets, which would involve the
burden of extra police duty4 9 and possible political repercussions.50
But even if such policy considerations are acceptable, the antistrikebreaking provisions in question seem somewhat inconsistent with
the aim of eliminating picket line violence. It seems likely that such
violence will arise regardless of whether the persons attempting to
cross the picket line are newly hired replacements or simply nonstriking
personnel, and regardless of whether the replacements are hired by
third parties, brought in from outside the state or "professional strikebreakers." It could be argued, however, that such restrictions do
have a bearing on picket line violence in that their effect would be to
limit the number of persons who could be recruited to cross the picket
line and to decrease the likelihood that an employer would be able to
continue operations during the strike.
It has been suggested that public policy should condemn persons
who profit from industrial strife and who encourage it by making
labor replacements readily available."' Such an argument is aimed at
third parties, not directly involved in the labor dispute, who assist the
employer by recruiting, supplying or referring replacements. Although
the main target is said to be "strikebreaking agencies," the legislative
provisions in question would apply to anyone, even if the referral of
replacements was not his principal line of business, or if he received no
compensation for such assistance. Such people are unlikely purposely
to foment strikes.
A similar policy argument against the exploitation and encouragement of industrial strife has been applied to "professional strikebreakers," or persons who "customarily and repeatedly" work or offer
to work as labor replacements, so as to justify laws which prohibit
their hiring as replacements. It has been alleged that such persons
are of no benefit to a community because their only interest is to reap
income and then move on, and that in the meantime they pose a
threat to public welfare because of their generally undesirable character.
The International Typographical Union, in its literature supporting
anti-strikebreaking laws, has cited numerous instances in which labor
replacements have been involved in crime, the carrying of weapons
and disorderly conduct. 2 In actuality, however, such occurrences
appear to be extremely rare. Nevertheless, there are probably some
personality traits common to those persons who engage in "professional
strikebreaking." In the newspaper industry, for example, strikebreak49 d. at 123-28.
5o

'

See Stewart & Townsend, supra note 47, at 465-71.

61 International Typographical Union, Rats for Hire-The Story of Professional

Strikebreakers (undated pamphlet obtainable from the ITU, on file in Biddle Law

Library, University of Pennsylvania).

62See International Typographical Union, Facts About Professional Strikebreakers (undated pamphlet obtainable from the ITU, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania).
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ing generally attracts persons with a rootless, restless character who
are motivated not only by the money, but by the travel and the excitement and challenge of putting out a paper under strike conditions.53
Some may seek work as replacements because the ITU hiring clauses
limit their opportunities to obtain regular jobs elsewhere, and such
persons frequently remain as regular employees long after the strike
has been defeated. Others, however, may have become strikebreakers
because of such problems as alcoholism and emotional instability which
make it impossible for them to hold steady jobs. These traits usually
do not come to the surface until after the initial excitement of the strike
has abated, and when their behavior becomes a serious problem, employers usually discharge them as quickly as possible. It is probably
true that a struck employer is compelled by the circumstances to hire
persons of lower moral character than he would usually require;
however, a person with a known history of serious trouble will generally
not be hired as a replacement unless it is absolutely necessary.
Validity Under the Due Process Clause 54-- Vagueness
Many of the anti-strikebreaking provisions, in their present form,
seem to violate the due process requirement that statutes should not
be so vague in their language that an ordinary person is unable to
determine what behavior constitutes the offense.55
In State v.
5
Packard,
" the only case in which an anti-strikebreaking law has yet
been constitutionally tested, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a
1952 statute on these grounds. The statute required "every person
before commencing employment with any person, firm or corporation
whose employees are out on labor strike called by a national[ly] recognized union to register with the industrial commission of Utah." -" The
court held that since an ordinary person could not be expected to know
what was meant by "a nationally recognized union" or whether such a
union had called the strike, the statute was unconstitutionally vague.58
The anti-strikebreaking provisions discussed in this Comment also
raise serious questions in this regard.
53 See note 42 supra.

54 Any argument that the anti-replacement laws violate substantive economic due
process has probably been foreclosed by Supreme Court decisions since 1937. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937). But see Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 176 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn.
1959). However, this doctrine may still have influence in some state courts. See
generally Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. U.L. Rv. 226 (1958).
55 See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932);
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927) ; Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).
57 Id. at 371, 250 P.2d at 562. (Emphasis added.)
58 Id. at 376-79, 250 P.2d at 564-65. The court also held that the distinction
between nationally recognized and other unions violated equal protection. Id. at
379-80, 250 P.2d at 566.
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One of the most typical provisions makes it a crime for any person
to hire as a labor replacement a "professional strikebreaker" " or "any
person who customarily and repeatedly offers himself for employment
in the place of employees involved in a labor strike or lockout." " An
accompanying provision also makes it a crime for any such "professional strikebreaker" or person who comes under the "customarily
and repeatedly" definition to take or offer to take the place in employment of employees involved in a labor dispute.6 ' Although the terms
"professional strikebreaker" and "customarily and repeatedly" probably
apply to persons who make it their primary business to travel from
one strike to another, and not to persons who have worked or offered
to work only once, it is questionable whether they provide sufficient
guidelines for an ordinary person to determine whether he, or the
person he is hiring, has crossed the borderline into the proscribed
category."2
Many of the anti-strikebreaking statutes use the term "labor
dispute" to determine when the law applies and whether a labor
replacement has worked or offered to work as such previously.6 3 This
term might be held unconstitutionally vague since it is usually undefined in the statutes, and most states do not define it elsewhere in their
labor legislation. It is doubtful that an ordinary person would be
familiar with the broad definition of "labor dispute" found in section
2(9) of the National Labor Relations Act," or would be able, by
personal observation, to determine whether such a dispute existed in
the absence of an actual strike or lockout. 5 A further objection arises
5 E.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 42, tit. A (1963).
60
E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 853 (Supp. 1966).
61

E.g., N.H. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:2 (1966).
of the anti-strikebreaking provisions, on the other hand, might cite
Justice Holmes' observation that "the law is full of instances where a man's fate
depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some
matter of degree." Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). There are
many instances where the Supreme Court has upheld criminal statutes phrased in
seemingly indefinite or relative terms. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343
(1918), in which a statute forbidding the grazing of sheep on public domain on
"ranges" previously occupied by cattle, or "usually" occupied by cattle raisers was
upheld as being sufficiently definite in its terms. Nevertheless, it is usually required
that some standard of guilt be found either in the statutory language, in the judicial
history of the words used or in some widely accepted concept of "reasonableness."
For example, the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act are based on the terms
"restraint of trade" and "attempts to monopolize." Although this language is seemingly indefinite, the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), held that it was not impermissibly vague since the terms used had their origin
in the common law and were familiar in the law of the United States prior to and
at the time of the adoption of the act. Furthermore, Chief Justice White, speaking
for a majority of the Court, indicated that the statute was saved from the charge
of vagueness by the fact that its terms would be interpreted according to the "rule
of reason." Id. at 66.
3 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 150D, § 2 (1965).
64 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964), quoted in text at note 27 mspra.
65 In Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345 (1949), the Supreme Court upheld, over
objections on the ground of vagueness, a statute which made it unlawful "for any
person acting in concert with one or more other persons, to assemble at or near any
62 Supporters
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from the fact that many of the anti-strikebreaking laws do not include
knowledge or "scienter" as an element of the offense. 6 Since most
states do not now require notification of the existence of a "labor
dispute," 67 an ordinary person would probably not know whether
"labor disputes" existed in places where he had applied for work in
the past. It might also be impossible for an employer to know whether
a person he is hiring has worked or applied for work as a replacement
in places where there were labor disputes unless the person being
hired knows himself and tells the employer.
The question of vagueness, however, is not crucial to the basic
objectives of anti-strikebreaking legislation, since the problems might
be resolved either by narrow construction of the vague terms by state
courts or by careful drafting. For example, the anti-strikebreaking
statutes in some states have been drafted so as to apply only to "knowing violations." s The Maine statute clarifies the definition of a
place where a 'labor dispute' exists and by force or violence prevent or attempt to
prevent any person from engaging in any lawful vocation, or for any person . . . to
promote, encourage or aid any such unlawful assemblage .

§ 81-207 (1960).

.

.

."

Anx. STAT. ANN.

As applied in that case, against mass pickets, the use of the term
"labor dispute" does not raise any due process problems, since obviously union members
would not be blocking access to a plant without realizing that a strike was in progress.
6 One of the arguments the Supreme Court has sometimes relied on to uphold
an otherwise vague statute has been the notion that the defendant had "scienter," or
guilty knowledge, which served to clarify the uncertainty. A statute is easier to
uphold against a charge of vagueness if it applies only to a knowing violation or if
the offense is one which requires a specific intent. See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 342 U. S. 337 (1952) ; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S.
497 (1925). It seems that clarificatory "scienter" must consist of more than what the
term implies at common law-the mere knowing performance of an act with the intent
to bring about the proscribed conduct, regardless of whether the defendant knew that
the act was proscribed. Clarificatory "scienter" must envisage not only a knowledge
of what is done, but a knowledge that what is done is unlawful, or at least so morally
"wrong" that it is probably unlawful. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreuw Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 67, 87 n.98 (1960).
But under the anti-strikebreaking provisions in question it is not the act itself
that is wrong-for the statute does not outlaw the replacement of strikers. Nor does
the act change in character, no matter how many times it is committed. Instead, the
judgment which the strikebreaker must make is whether or not he falls into a certain
category of persons forbidden to engage in an otherwise lawful act See Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutionally
vague a statute prohibiting "gangsters" from carrying certain weapons, where the
prohibited class was defined as "any person not engaged in any lawful occupation,"
known to be a member of a gang of two or more persons, and convicted at least three
times of crime. The class determination in the present case is fraught with interpretational difficulties. For example, under one possible interpretation of the language
a person might cease to fall within the proscribed category after having abstained
from labor replacement for a period of time. This might allow a person to balance
his strikebreaking and non-strikebreaking activities so that he will be working as a
labor replacement less than half the time. On the other hand, it is possible that the
words "customarily and repeatedly" could be interpreted to cover this situation also.
The type of judgment which would be involved seems too uncertain to be demanded
of a person of ordinary intelligence, especially where the law offers insufficient guidance
as to what is actually prohibited, and where the acts forbidden are never in themselves
made illegal. For other cases involving indefiniteness as to what persons are within
the scope of legislation, see United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952) ; Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).
67
E.g., Wis. STAT. § 103.43 (Supp. 1966).
68 E.g., N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 275-A :2 (1966).
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professional strikebreaker by providing that it shall be prima facie
evidence of "customarily and repeatedly" seeking to act as a replacement if the person has offered two times previously to take the place
of a person involved in a strike or lockout.' The vagueness surrounding the term "labor dispute" has been avoided in the statutes of some
states by simply referring only to situations where there is a "strike
or lockout." 70
Validity Under the Commerce Clause
It has been suggested that statutes and ordinances which regulate
or prohibit the importation of labor replacements from outside the
state or city may go beyond the state's power to interfere with the
movement of persons in interstate travel. 1 This argument is based on
Edwards v. California,72 in which the Supreme Court struck down a
California statute which made it a misdemeanor for any person to
bring or assist in bringing into the state any indigent person. The
Court rejected the contention that the exclusion of indigents was within
the state's police power, and held that the transportation of persons is
within the scope of interstate commerce, which only Congress may
regulate. The Court declared that although the states are not precluded from exercising their police power in matters of local concern,
even though they may thereby affect interstate commerce, the prohibition in question did not come within the permissible scope of state
police power.
The statute involved in the Edwards case was passed in response
to conditions existing during the Depression-in particular, the
migration of large numbers of indigent persons into the state in search
of employment or public relief. The state took the position that its
first obligation was to provide for its own resident unemployed, and
that the arrival of nonresident indigents would result in the sapping
of public welfare funds and the taking of jobs that might have otherwise gone to residents. The Court rejected this argument, declaring
that, of the boundaries to the permissible area of state legislative activity,
"none is more certain than the prohibition against attempts on the
part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties common to
all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property
across its borders." 73
69 Mr. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 855
70 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. §23:901

(Supp. 1966).
(1964).

7177 HAgV. L. REv. 377, 380-81 (1963).
72314 U.S. 160 (1941).
73 Id. at 173.

The importation provisions of the anti-replacement laws probably

do not violate the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the Constitution,
which prohibits only discrimination

based on

"citizenship."

Douglas v. New

York,

N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). In the Douglas case, a New York venue
statute which limited the circumstances under which state courts could accept jurisdiction in cases brought by nonresident plaintiffs was attacked by a nonresident as violative
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Although the anti-replacement provisions in question place a restriction upon the recruitment of employees from the national labor
market, the present statutes are more related to a legitimate state
interest than that struck down in Edwards. "The police power of a
state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the
duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and
tranquility of a community." 74 The regulation of strikebreaking, because of its relation to violence and labor strife, certainly comes within
the scope of state police power. Moreover, the statute in Edwards
excluded an entire segment of the population, while the anti-replacement
provisions do not exclude the strike replacements as persons, but only
their importation for a particular purpose. Furthermore, the type of
statute invalidated by the Court in Edwards would have had a much
more pervasive effect on the national economy-if retaliatory measures
had been passed in sister states, all interstate economic relocation
throughout the country would have been prevented. The limited effect
of the anti-replacement laws would pose no such threat. Balancing
the states' interest in preventing picket line violence against the amount
of the burden on interstate commerce, it seems unlikely that the antireplacement laws would be held to be an unconstitutional intrusion
by the states into the area which is committed to the exclusive regulation of Congress. However, the state legislation might still be held
to be invalid if it could be found that Congress had exercised its
power to regulate the practice of strikebreaking, thereby preempting
state regulation of the same area.
Preemption by Federal Statutes
There are two federal statutes which arguably preempt state antireplacement laws. The first of these is the Byrnes Act, passed in
1936, which makes it a felony for anyone willfully to transport in interstate or foreign commerce "any person who is employed or is to be
employed for the purpose of obstructing or interfering by force or
threats with (1) peaceful picketing by employees during any labor
controversy affecting wages, hours, or conditions of labor, or (2) the
exercise by employees of any of the rights of self-organization or collective bargaining," and also makes it a felony for anyone to travel
75
in interstate or foreign commerce for any of these purposes.
of his privileges and immunities. The Court upheld the legislation on the ground
that it applied equally to nonresidents who were citizens of New York and nonresidents
who were citizens of other states. Id. at 387. Similarly, the anti-strikebreaking provisions in question could probably be defended on the narrow ground that they simply
outlaw the importation of replacements regardless of the citizenship of the persons
imported. Under the reasoning of the Douglas case, this argument would prevail
regardless of the great correlation between citizenship, residence and place of recruitment. But see Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
74 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949).
75 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1964).
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The "strikebreakers" regulated by the Byrnes Act were obviously,
on the face of the statute, not mere labor replacements but armed
guards and "goon squads" used to harass and intimidate strikers
and break up picket lines. The Byrnes Act has not been very effective
since, in the only case in which it has been invoked in a prosecution,
the defendants apparently were acquitted because requisite intent could
not be shown to have existed at the time the strikebreakers were
transported across state lines. 6 It is significant that although this act
was passed in a decade characterized by industrial strife and pro-labor
legislation, Congress made no effort to prevent employers from hiring
persons as replacements for strikers. It can be argued that Congress
well recognized the problems involved, and in passing a law which
prohibited only the interstate transportation of persons to interfere
with peaceful picketing and self-organization by force or threats,
Congress chose to permit the interstate transportation of persons for
the purpose of merely replacing strikers.7 7 An extensive discussion
of the effect of the Byrnes Act is not really necessary, however, since
preemption is sufficiently established under a second, more encompassing, act of Congress.
The National Labor Relations Act 78 appears to preempt all state
and municipal anti-strikebreaking laws insofar as they apply to businesses within the jurisdictional guidelines 79 of the National Labor
Relations Board. Grounds for preemption must be drawn from the
purpose and effect of the act, since it does not on its face dispose of
the issue of strikebreaking. Although various language contained
within it apparently refers to situations in which strikers have been
replaced,80 thus indicating congressional recognition of the existence
of the practice of labor replacement, nowhere does the act specifically
protect from state interference the right of employers to replace strikers.
Cases, such as NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.," which recognize
management's right to hire labor replacements, have been based simply
76
United States v. Bergoff, CCH LAB. L. REP. 1113810.05, 5180.03 (D. Conn.
1937). The case is unreported, but the CCH comment suggests that failure to show
the requisite intent caused their acquittal.
77 See 80 CONG. Rc. 10218-22 (1936) ; 79 CONG. REc. 14105-06 (1935).
78 61 Stat 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
79 See National Labor Relations Act § 14(c), 61 Stat 151 (1947), as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1964).
80 Section 2(3), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964), provides:
The term "employee" shall include . . . any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute
or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment ....

Section 9(c) (3), 61 Stat 144 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1964),

grants voting rights to permanently replaced economic strikers:
Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find
are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Act in any election
conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike . . ..
81304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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upon the failure of the act to prohibit this practice. It has been held
that the National Labor Relations Act at least preempts state legislation attempting to regulate practices which are either protected or
prohibited by the act.82 If the doctrine of preemption were to depend
only upon the strict wording of the act, it would appear that since the
practice of replacement is neither explicitly protected nor prohibited,
state regulation of such conduct would be permissible.
However, the Supreme Court has stated that in determining the
question of preemption, it is necessary to examine whether the underlying policy of the federal legislation would be frustrated by the state
law in question."3 The National Labor Relations Act constitutes a
comprehensive and detailed scheme for the regulation of labor disputes.' The avowed purpose of the statute is
to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing
the interference by either [employers or employees] with the
legitimate rights of the other . . . to define and proscribe

practices on the part of labor and management which affect
commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to
protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerceY
It would appear that the regulation of labor replacement practices
would fall within this broad statement of policy. There are two specific
arguments in support of this proposition.
The first is that anti-strikebreaking laws would interfere with the
system of collective bargaining set up by the federal act. In the
National Labor Relations Act, Congress has attempted to protect the
effectiveness of the bargaining process by setting guidelines as to the
practices that may be engaged in by management and labor in pressing
their demands. By allocating a certain choice of economic weapons
to each side, Congress has set up a balance of power with which state
law will not be allowed to interfere. This is true whether or not the
economic weapon in question is specifically protected by the act.
Thus, in Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton,86 the Supreme
Court reversed a lower court judgment against the union, which had
been based on Ohio common law, for inducing other employers, to
boycott the primary employer. Section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act,8 7 while allowing recovery against a union for inducing
other employees to engage in a secondary boycott, does not specifically
82

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).

83

Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964).

See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
85 Section 1(b), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964).
86377 U.S. 252 (1964).
87 61 Stat. 158 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
84
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protect or prohibit the practice of inducing other employers to boycott.
Nevertheless, the Court held:
Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress
between the conflicting interests of the union, the employees,
the employer and the community . . . . If the Ohio law of
secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type
of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe
when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of
self-help available, and to upset the balance of power between
labor and management expressed in our national labor
policy.'
Since the right to replace strikers existed prior to the National
Labor Relations Act, it seems likely that Congress presupposed the
existence of this power when it protected the rights of strikers, and
that in setting up the balance which it did, Congress assumed that the
right to replace strikers would continue. Therefore, any attempt by
a state to interfere with the power of an employer to resist a strike by
hiring replacements goes right to the heart of collective bargaining.
The second ground for preemption is that anti-strikebreaking
laws, in their attempt to strengthen the effectiveness of the strike
weapon, encroach upon the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board to determine what employer activities constitute
unfair labor practices. Section 8(a) (1) " of the federal act forbids
employers "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the
exercise of their right to strike and engage in other concerted activities.
The Supreme Court has held that whenever an activity is "arguably
subject" to this section, "the States as well as the federal courts must
defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted." 90 There are repeated examples in which employer tactics
in response to a strike--including certain replacement practices-have
been held unlawful by the NLRB. For example, it has been held that
an employer's grant of "superseniority" for replacements and nonstrikers in an economic strike may constitute an unfair labor practice
giving replaced strikers a right to reinstatement9 It has also been
held an unfair labor practice for an employer to hire replacements after
the end of an economic strike and after the strikers have applied unconditionally for reinstatement."2 Since the NLRB has in these and
88 Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259 (1964).

8961 Stat 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
90
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
91 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
92 NLRB v. Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1944).
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other situations held labor replacement to be an unfair labor practice,
it seems that such activities fall within the scope of the federal act, and
state regulation of these matters is preempted. 3
Such preemption exists regardless of the fact that the antistrikebreaking laws supplement rather than detract from federal regulation of labor replacement practices. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 4 the Supreme Court stated:
The test .

.

. is whether the matter on which the State

asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal
Act. If it is, the federal scheme prevails though it is a more
modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the State."
In the labor area, however, federal preemption does not completely preclude all exercise of state police power. The Supreme Court
has indicated that a state may act where the activity regulated is "a
merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act
.

.

.

. or where the regulated conduct [touches] interests so deeply

rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." " Such state interests have
been generally characterized as those dealing with the maintenance
of domestic peace against conduct marked by violence and imminent
threats to the public order,9 7 and those dealing with traditional breach
of contract problems.9 8 States and municipalities therefore have not
been precluded from outlawing mass picketing and other activity which
may result in industrial violence.9 On the other hand, the mere
danger of picket line violence is not sufficient to permit states to in9

3 See 77 HA v. L. REv. 377, 379 (1963).
94 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
95 Id. at 236.
96 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
97 See, e.g., UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
98 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
But see id. at 623 (Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).
99 The National Labor Relations Board has held that picketing calculated to
prevent nonstriking workers from entering the plant is a union unfair labor practice
because it interferes with the nonstrikers' right to refrain from concerted action.
See, e.g., Local 2772, United Steelworkers (Vulcan-Cincinnati Corp.), 137 N.L.R.B.
95 (1962); Local 5895, United Steelworkers (Carrier Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B. 127
(1961); Local 3887, United Steelworkers (Stephenson Brick & Tile Co.), 129 N.L.
R.B. 6 (1960); Local 1150, United Elec. Workers (Cory Corp.), 84 N.L.R.B. 972
(1949). In spite of the existence of the federal remedies, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the preemption doctrine does not take from the states the "power
to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of violence." UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274 (1956). See also UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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fringe upon such protected activities as "stranger picketing" by persons
who are not employees of the business being picketed.'
It seems clear that the anti-strikebreaking laws do not fall within
the limited range of state action permitted by federal labor policy.
Although states may have a justifiable interest in preventing picket
line violence, there are more direct methods by which this can be
accomplished (e.g., outlawing mass picketing) which would have a
less disruptive effect on federal policy. The economic justifications
for anti-strikebreaking laws are, for preemption purposes, completely
outside the area in which the states may act, since they involve questions of labor policy which Congress has already chosen to resolve on
the federal level. The "job protection" aspect of the laws is specifically
preempted by section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which authorizes the NLRB to reinstate with back pay any employee
who is injured by an unfair labor practice.' 0 1 It seems clear, furthermore, that the principal purpose and effect of the laws is not merely
within the "peripheral concern" of the federal act. Rather, these laws
attempt to protect the power of employees in regard to collective
bargaining and concerted activities, thus encroaching on one of the
principal objectives of the federal legislation. 0"
Finding an Alternative for Regulating the Use of Replacements
Although the anti-strikebreaking laws discussed in this Comment
are for many reasons unacceptable in their present form, problems
are raised by the practice of labor replacement which are nevertheless
100 See Waxman v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 4, reversing per curiam 203 Va. 257, 123
S.E.2d 381 (1962). The Supreme Court reversed the affirmation of a conviction
under a Virginia statute prohibiting "stranger picketing." To support its reversal,
the Court only cited San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
10161 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
102 Municipal anti-strikebreaking ordinances might run afoul not only of federal,
but of state preemption. Many states have enacted their own labor relations acts
(which take effect in cases over which the National Labor Relations Board declines or
lacks jurisdiction). See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-4-1 to -22 (1963) ; HAWAII
REV. LAWS §§ 90-2, 90-3, 90-6, 90-7, 90-10, 90-12 (Supp. 1965); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN.§§ 44-807 to -815 (1964) ; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 150A, §§ 1-12 (1965) ; MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §§17.454(10.4), (11), (14), (14.2), (14.8), (17), (18), (23), (25),
(28)-(32) (Supp. 1965) ; MINN.STAT. §§ 179.01-.60 (1966) ; N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 700-

717; PA. STAT. ANN.tit.
43, §§211.1-.13 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§28-7-16,
-29,-45 (Supp. 1965) ;Wis. STAT. §§ 111.03, .06 (Supp. 1966).
In In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964), the

California Supreme Court made it clear that municipalities may not legislate concerning matters in which the field has been occupied by state law. See also In re Lane,
58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962) ; Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d
162, 339 P.2d 801 (1959). After considering existing state statutes regulating the
sending of part-time employees to work as replacements in the plant of another employer, and prohibiting the recruitment of transportation of replacements without
notifying them of the existence of a strike or lockout, the Attorney General of California has handed down a recent opinion concluding that proposed municipal antistrikebreaking ordinances were preempted by state law. Opinions of the Attorney
General of Calif., No. 64/301 (June 22, 1965). It appears that the same reasoning
can be applied in many other states having similar regulatory statutes-especially
where state anti-strikebreaking statutes already exist.
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worthy of legislative attention. One such problem is that of picket
line violence. Another is the need to protect the bargaining power
of unions in circumstances where replacements are readily available,
while at the same time protecting the interests of employers who are
especially vulnerable to shutdowns.
The danger of picket line violence, although an appropriate subject for state and local legislation, does not in itself justify the prohibition of labor replacement. The primary cause of these disturbances
has repeatedly been shown not to be the entrance of replacements into
the employer's place of business, but rather the mass picketing situation
created by the union in an attempt to block their entrance.'0 3 While
peaceful picketing is a protected activity, mass picketing which by
force tries to prevent access to or egress from a place of business is
not." ' Furthermore, federal labor policy, by including replacement
in those weapons allowed management, has in effect created a "right
to replace" in the employer. 10 5 If the local government must take sides
in its attempt to prevent violence, it should be the side with the legally
protected right. 6
But a complete resolution of the problems of strikebreaking must
extend beyond the application of stringent measures against mass
picketing, since this by itself would tend only to weaken the bargaining
position of labor by making labor replacement more feasible. Also, in
light of the national scope of already existing labor legislation, the
nationwide bargaining in many industries, the interstate character of
labor markets and the need to preserve the uniform effect of national
labor policy, it seems preferable that basic labor objectives (insofar
as they affect businesses under the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board) be obtained by legislation at the federal level, rather
than by piecemeal state criminal statutes.
The bills recently introduced in Congress 107-- which, like the state
statutes, prohibit outright the use of "customary and repeated" strikebreakers and those referred by third parties-do not provide a fair or
comprehensive answer. They would impose a heavy and unjustified
burden on those industries, such as newspapers, which must rely on
such persons, and would not affect the situation in which the employer
may readily draw from a large supply of local unemployed. Any such
legislation, to be effective, should instead apply equally to employers
or unions regardless of circumstances. At the same time it must protect
employers acting in good faith from the blackmail effect which might
103 See generally Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Need for Federal
Injunctions, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 459 (1966); Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 123-28

(1964).

104 See id. at 120.
105 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).

10 6 See Note, 113 U.
107 S.

(1965).

PA. L. REv. 111, 136 (1964).
1781, H.R. 9422, H.R. 10536, H.R. 10623, H.R. 10746, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
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result if unions were allowed to shut them down with impunity.
Although a provision requiring compulsory arbitration of all labor
disputes might be effective in preventing abuses by either party, such
a remedy would have profound effects on national labor policy not justified by the limited scope of the problems involved in strikebreaking.'
One method would be to incorporate the use of labor replacements
into the list of prohibited employer practices of the National Labor
Relations Act. But to prevent the sanctioning of injustice and union
abuses, any restrictions on the use of replacements should at least make
exceptions for cases where the strike is in breach of contract, or in
support of demands outside the permissible scope of collective bargaining, or where the union has committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain in good faith.
In regard to unlawful or unfair labor practice strikes, the present
law should be left unchanged. Where the strike itself is unlawful
(either under the National Labor Relations Act or under a collective
bargaining agreement) the employer should be permitted freely to use
labor replacements. Where the strike is called to protest an employer
unfair labor practice, the use of temporary replacements should also
be permitted while the issue is being litigated, since if an unfair labor
practice is found, the National Labor Relations Board, under existing
law, may order the reinstatement of the strikers. 0 9
The solution thus lies in the application of such legislation to
economic strikes and bargaining lockouts. But even in these areas,
prohibition of the use of replacements would raise problems in those
cases where the power to replace is the only effective weapon which
the employer has to back up his bargaining position with the union.
To deprive him of this power would be detrimental to collective bargaining, which is promoted when the two parties are of relatively equal
strength. There are two sides to this argument, both based on the
doctrine of letting economic circumstances cast the burden where
they may. It can be argued on behalf of prohibiting replacement that
employees in industries less able to withstand shutdowns should be
allowed to reap the benefit of their enhanced bargaining position, and
thus command higher wages. But it can just as easily be said in
support of the present system that employees, in jobs for which replacements can be obtained, should accept the consequences of their less
favorable bargaining position and think twice before striking. Any
simple resolution of this dilemma-either by prohibiting replacement
in economic strikes or by leaving the present federal law unchangedwould thus be tantamount to siding with either management or labor,
and would result in some inequities in either case.
108 Note, Arbitration of Disptdes Over. New Labor Contract Terms, 15 W. :REs.

L. R . 735, 740-44 (1964).
109 Labor Management Relations Act § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(c) (1964).
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The answer to the problem is to formulate some standard for
determining when labor replacements may be used. The goal is
twofold: to allow employees to strike in support of reasonable demands
without fear of losing their jobs to replacements, and yet not to tie
the hands of an employer when the union's demands are unreasonable
or excessive. The determination of what constitute reasonable terms
of settlement in a given dispute would best be made by some form of
arbitration. However, it is not necessary that the arbitration actually
be carried out in order to decide whether or not replacements may be
used. All that is required is that a party who is willing to submit the
dispute to binding arbitration not be prejudiced by the other's refusal
to do so.
For example, if before the strike or lockout an employer makes a
bona fide offer to arbitrate and the union refuses, he should not be
prevented from hiring labor replacements to continue his business.
The employees would have no grounds to complain, since they would
have been offered an ample opportunity to achieve a reasonable settlement without risking their jobs. If the employer fails to make such
an offer, he should not be allowed to use replacements. He will now
have no grounds to complain of "labor blackmail," since he could
have protected himself by offering to arbitrate. Similar legislation at
the state level would be appropriate for those instances where the
NLRB declines or lacks jurisdiction.
As an example of how labor replacement regulations might be
formulated under the National Labor Relations Act, an amendment
to section 8(a) of the act would provide:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
involved in a lawful economic strike or lockout to employ
any person hired for the purpose of replacing an employee
involved in such strike or lockout unless, prior to such strike
or lockout, the employer shall have made a bona fide offer to
the union to submit all issues in dispute to binding
arbitration."'
If the employer violates this provision, the strike would be transformed
into an unfair labor practice strike. The National Labor Relations
Board would be authorized to seek a court injunction"' against the
employer's use of replacements and to order the reinstatement of the
l2
aggrieved employees, possibly with back pay."
10 To avoid a possible impasse between the parties in selecting an arbitrator,
arbitrator
the proposed legislation should also contain procedures under which such
Mediation and
could be appointed by a disinterested third party, such as the Federal
Conciliation Service, which was established by § 202 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 153 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 172-173 (1964).

11161 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964).
112 61 Stat 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
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Although this may at first glance seem to be a radical departure
from the present theory of free collective bargaining, it should be
remembered that compulsory arbitration itself is not unknown to
federal labor legislation." 3 The present proposal would have a far less
pervasive effect on the national economy than a general compulsory
arbitration law, since it would affect only those limited situations in
which labor replacement is feasible. The proposed system would be
more accurately characterized as a form of "voluntary arbitration" of
new contract terms," 4 since it would allow both management and the
union the freedom to choose between relying on arbitration as a means
of resolving the dispute and upon those economic bargaining weapons
which the law would leave available. If the effectiveness of the strike
weapon and the right of an employer to protect his business are both
to be preserved, it seems that such a system is the only just means of
regulating the use of labor replacements.
113 The compulsory arbitration of grievances is provided under the Railway Labor

Act §§ 3 First, (i), (m), 48 Stat. 1189 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 First,
(i), (m) (1964). See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Florida E. C. Ry.,
346 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1965). In 1963, Congress passed a joint resolution providing
for the compulsory arbitration of a dispute between railroad companies and locomotive
firemen regarding the elimination of jobs on certain trains. Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77
Stat. 132 (1963). Both the constitutionality of the act and the validity of the arbitration award were upheld. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R., 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 918 (1964).
114 See generally Note, Arbitration of Disputes Over New Labor Contract Terms,
15 W. REs. L. Rxv. 735 (1964).

